What is Humanitarianism in War?

Many may remember President H.W. Bush’s decision near the end of the First Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm). In that conflict, the commander-in-chief prudently approved the use of overwhelming force, a strategy recommended by General Colin Powell. Having obtained his objective, the defeat of Saddam Hussein, supported by virtually the entire world, including most Arab countries, Bush the Elder ordered a halt to the televised slaughter of retreating Iraqi forces from Kuwait City. His well-intended humanitarian decision was predicated in part on the awareness that the countries that had backed the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait might not have supported an invasion of Iraq, allowing the tyrant to cling to power. 

Is John Fisher’s quote appropriate here? “The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is imbecility.” President Clinton attempted humanitarian wars in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Somalia with decidedly mixed results. There are occasions when limited objectives are perfectly reasonable, such as the goal of the original intervention in Afghanistan. However, it is imperative that the national command authority not forget its original intent and slip gradually into a broader conflict, often described as mission creep. This, regrettably, is precisely what happened in Afghanistan when civilian leadership misplaced its original objective and shifted its gaze to Iraq. Regrettably, the nation’s goal in Afghanistan changed from eliminate Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, to defeat the Taliban militarily while transforming Afghanistan into a semi-modern nation-state. Only the former aim was attainable. Objective is the first principle of war for good reason. A wise seafarer’s quote follows, “If you do not know your destination, all winds are foul.”

Defining Immorality

In some ways it is an understandable outcome. All soldiers, but most especially generals, owe their allegiance to the Constitution and the President. Flag officers are required by their oaths of office to be loyal to our most senior civilian leaders, even if they believe them to be wrong. The overwhelming majority have proven that they will hold their tongues publicly in check, at least while on active duty. They hopefully advised their commander-in-chief privately of mistaken selections in national strategic objectives. Nearly 2,500 American soldiers died in Afghanistan because of President Bush’s choices. Roughly 1,000 NATO allies also paid the ultimate price. Of course, the number of dead Afghans dwarfs these numbers. This outcome strikes me as immoral.

What of Intent?

Can anyone make a case that Afghans are better off today under the women’s rights deniers within the barbarous Taliban? Roughly half the population of the country has been re-enslaved. This of course begs yet another question. What makes America’s wars different from so many others? Could it be intent? The nation today subscribes to the shared and accepted democratic and humanitarian values of the West, which might be fully applied only when the fighting is done, and the war won. By contrast, the Taliban’s intent is brutal domination and draconian control. Putin’s intent in Ukraine is similar, though for different reasons. The Geneva Convention pretty much outlaws much of how the Russian dictator is prosecuting his war of choice against Ukraine. Murdering civilians, rapes, torture, and destroying public infrastructure. Ruthlessness defines their actions. Frighteningly, and with the singular exception of North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, the Kremlin’s current master represents the only regime on the planet to publicly threaten the use of nuclear weapons. These autocrats are considered criminals, not only because of their reprehensible actions, but because of their malevolent aspirations (their intent) as well. The point is hopefully clear. Intent can come to define a conflict. But the method — killing — will always be the same. The proof can only be found in the aftermath’s bloody pudding. The road to hell may indeed be paved with good intentions, but does that mean that intent shouldn’t matter?

Conclusion

It was suggested to me by one of the reviewers of this essay that America did not lose the war in Afghanistan but instead merely withdrew. I was left to wonder if this was a distinction lacking a difference. If the US has become too civilized — meaning lacking ruthlessness — based in Western values and respect for law, to fight adversaries like the Taliban and their kindred, who care nothing for what popular commentator Ralph Peters characterizes as, “America’s war-fighting table manners,” future commanders-in-chief must find the wisdom to avoid such limited conflicts or learn to select more realistic and attainable objectives. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves that the military do not have the luxury of selecting their opponents. The questions raised in this essay remain in desperate need of answer.

First published under a different title in the Tampa Bay Times. Used with permission.

Robert Bruce Adolph, a military strategist and former intelligence officer, is a retired Army Special Forces lieutenant colonel and United Nations security chief, who holds graduate degrees in both National Security Studies and International Affairs. A former university lecturer on US Government and American History, his written works have appeared in most US Armed Forces publications of note. Adolph has also been a frequent guest columnist for Florida’s Tampa Bay Times, Holland’s Atlantic Perspectives Magazine, and the US Military Times. Today, he is an international speaker and author of the book entitled, “Surviving the United Nations: The Unexpected Challenge.” In May of 2022, he served as mission leader for a multi-national team in support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine.

Learn more at robertbruceadolph.com.